What is Meant by No Greater? Part I

It may seem to some that the definition “He than which a greater cannot be conceived” is confusing. Why not just say “the greatest being”? Why does a positive statement have to be put in negative form? It seems that this is a clumsy way to refer to something that is perfect in every way. There are things that need to be explained about the definition which Anselm uses.

In our cultural setting there is a push to have religion pushed out of any publicly supported area, such as schools, courts, government buildings or offices, and anything that is done in them. Since North American countries are built upon a Christian culture, it follows that removing religious symbols and attachments means removing Christianity. In Canada that means the removal of the Roman Catholic or Protestant religions. The ideas of the ‘Separation of Church and State’ and ‘Freedom of Religion’ have come to a point where the exact opposites of their original meanings are now the norm: separation of church from the state, and freedom from religion, respectively.

Just as in these instances we have allowed the secular community around us, the culture in which we live, to dictate to us what we are talking about, what religion means, what freedom of conscience means, so also we have also allowed the culture to tell us what the definition of God is. That is the unbeliever’s first objection to Anselm: it is the believer’s definition, the believer’s outline of who God is; and that means that the idea of existence is already in the definition. It isn’t really a logical sequence of propositions, but only a delusion of an outcome that was already there in the premise, in the supposition it started with. 

It should be noted that Anselm neither invented the definition nor corrupted it to suit his own beliefs. There are reasons for the definition being put this way, and one of them has partly to do with a concession that is made to the one who says there is no God. We have to have a definition of God that he will agree to and that at the same time does not compromise in any way the idea of the God that the Bible tells us about. If our agreed definition does not agree with what the Bible says about God then the entire discussion is for nothing for both sides of the debate. The God which the person wants to deny is exactly that God of the Bible.

At the same time it has to be a definition that asks the question of God’s existence, and yet does not beg the question of God’s existence. This was the first objection to Anselm’s argument, and remains so to this day. “Begging the question” is the term used to indicate that the consequence is already implied in, or defined into, the premise. The modern form of this objection is to assert that this argument is a fallacy because it is impossible to assert God’s existence without defining existence into the premise.

We will examine this in more detail in another post. But it should be noted here that the problem is not in the definition itself. They are right to a point, that the definition all by itself is not open to being answered the one way or the other, but not for the reason that is given. But giving at least this much to the one who says there is no God is, in the first place, not giving away our own position and still allows the denier his opportunity to argue his case.

Anselm’s argument points out that it is the denier that has the problem, not the believer. In order to deny God’s existence the unbeliever has to have a concept of what it is he is denying in his mind. His intended outcome is to deny that God exists. Therefore the existence of this very God, the one described by this very definition, is the one that at least has to have existence in his mind. Not another definition, but this one. He can’t very well accept another to this point. That his understanding is a contradiction is not the believer’s fault, nor is it the definition’s fault. The definition is a necessity because of who God is, not a construction to suit the believer’s belief.  

I realize that this is exactly the part that is in dispute in the modern debate on this argument for God’s existence. But no matter what definition is applied to God, it must conform to that God whose existence is either affirmed or denied, and must not be a definition so that the two sides can be talking about different beings. The one who denies God’s existence will insist on the possibility of God’s non-existence, and that is the conceptual conundrum that Anselm points to: how would one conceive of such a being and still deny the God revealed in the Bible? 

How do we formulate a definition that makes sure that both sides of the argument are talking about exactly the same subject? How do we define God so that we can know on both sides of the debate that the other side is not cheating and actually talking about another entity or conception?  There has to be a working definition to which both sides may appeal, and to which either side can hold the other accountable; and it must have honesty and integrity to the intellect. That being must by definition be none other than a being who alone can claim to be God. Both sides of the debate would have to conform their conception of such a being to that reality, whether or not He exists.

 Thus the definition is put into the negative form, in the sense that every imperfection of being is excluded. It should be remembered that the one who says there is no God must be referring to the God that the believer says he believes in, and not a god that the believer will also deny exists. The one who denies God’s existence really does nothing if he defines God in such a way that it is not the God of the Bible, but rather the one that conforms to his own conception of God. So the definition must be in such a way as to exclude concepts which do not attain to God’s essence. Anselm is following Augustine’s example, by putting into use Augustine’s famous line “Removing what is false leads us on by degrees to things divine.”

That’s the whole point: the conception has to reach upward towards the possibility of such a being, to bring this definition to within the grasp of the limited conceptions of man, and yet be true to His eternal essence. Our minds could never circumscribe such a being, but we could eliminate by definition all erroneous concepts and all imperfect deities, so that all that remained by definition was that one being which alone could be the object of our discussion. If we listed everything that God is then the list would be endless, but if we ruled out the things He could be not we could do that with a statement that is not disrespectful of such a holy being.

The objection states that this description of God, “He than which a greater cannot be conceived”, is not a definition which solves the question of God’s existence because it defines existence into God from the start. The problem with this is not that the believer cannot define the God that denier is denying without assuming existence, but rather that the denier cannot define the God that the believer believes without contradiction. The believer doesn’t have to prove that the god the denier denies is the God he believes; rather the denier has to prove that the God he denies is the God the believer believes.

The God the believer puts all his hope in is that being who alone is most necessary for all things, even though this necessity goes far beyond the comprehension and the concepts of men. That is the premise Anselm goes from, and the definition “He than which a greater cannot be conceived” is a necessary consequence from that. The God that it is necessary for the denier to assert in order to deny His existence must be this God and no other.

In his mind he has to accept the definition that God is he than which no greater can be conceived if He exists, which the believer believes, and which he denies.

But there are more reasons for this definition, especially for the believer. 

Anselm's Argument

To understand Anselm’s argument there are two main thoughts that we should not at any point forget. The first is who the God is that we are either affirming or denying. The second is once we know who this God is it becomes impossible to deny His existence. This entry deals more with the second, but at the same time the first point is present throughout.

I’ll deal with the first point more directly in a future post, because we will have to deal with at least two main objections to Anselm’s argument: 1. This argument defines existence into God; and 2. So we have to admit there is a God, but none of this says that it is the God of the Bible. A response to these objections will have to come after we have seen what the argument is saying. So first we deal with the impossibility of rationally denying God’s existence.

The main point about the argument is that the one who says, “There is no God” has to talk about the God that the Bible affirms and that the believer claims to believe in. That is, by definition it can’t be a different god. But it is impossible to define that very same God that the Bible is about and then to have the same definition when you deny His existence.  This implies that we ought to know the God of the Bible better; and that has mostly been the problem when people try to understand the argument.

The argument goes like this:

We must first establish a definition of God that both the believer and the unbeliever can agree on. Anselm offers the definition that God is He “than which a greater cannot be conceived.” The believer and the denier would have to agree with this definition, because the believer will believe no less of a deity, and the denier would deny no less of a deity. But when the denier denies such a God he has to at the same time deny the definition that he has accepted.

Here’s why. A God that exists is greater in conception than a God that does not exist. And it is plain that if the denier can conceive of a being than which a greater cannot be conceived but which does not exist then  he can surely conceive of a being than which a greater cannot be conceived but which does exist. And this one is greater. Thus the God he is referring to, the one that does not exist, is not as great as the one he does not refer to, the one that does exist. In saying that He than which a greater cannot be conceived does not exist the denier is at the same time admitting that he can conceive of a greater than the God he is denying. So by definition it is not the same God which the believer believes. Nor is it the definition that the denier first had to agree to.

Anselm follows this up with a number of the attributes of God that are commonly called into question when people try to demonstrate the rationale of denying of God’s existence. The most usual attributes of God brought forward are God’s perfect justice and His perfect mercy. God cannot have the one without doing harm to the other, they assert. If God is merciful to the sinner then He is also being unjust in not punishing sin to its due requirement; and if God is perfectly just, and all men are sinners, then He cannot be merciful and so leave behind His justice. But it is clear that these people can conceive of a God whose justice and mercy do not violate each other, because the conception of a justice and a mercy that do not violate each other is greater in wisdom and power. God’s unlimited wisdom and power cannot be so that He is without power to be just. Nor is His wisdom limited by His justice so that He does not know how to show mercy.  So the God that they say cannot be both just and merciful is not He than which a greater cannot be conceived.

The believer right away thinks of Jesus, the God-man taking the full weight of the punishment for sin upon Himself, so that God could be perfectly and fully just and at the same time graciously and abundantly merciful; and he rejoices in such a glorious salvation. We need to pay careful attention to all that God says about Himself in the Bible, and not just be comfortable in our own narrow little definitions of who He is. The believer is always searching out his own errors in his thinking so that the God he believes in with his whole heart may be glorified in his thoughts as well.

Anselm, of course, is more eloquent in stating the argument than I am, as well as in defending God’s justice and mercy. I’m trying only to summarize it in the limited space of this journal entry. All I can do is summarize it partially; there is more to it than this brief summary.

There is a lot more to discuss that is either directly addressed or is implied in his argumentation.  This is enough, however to see that there are many, many applications to today’s secular world of God-denial. The most important application, I think, is to the modern assumption that any notion of God is only speculation at best, and that no one can prove any religion to be better and truer than another. All religions have to be seen as equal, and also be equally true. That, of course, is contradictory. The assumption of “no true religion” is 

exactly equal to “no religion at all”.

As an aside, isn’t it interesting that as you listen to John Lennon’s song Imagine, and it gets to the part where it says “and no religion too”, the people that the song is trying to convince are those who already believe in “no religion” because they steadfastly and firmly hold to the equality of all religions? It’s speaking to the secularized world. Neither Lennon nor those he was trying to convince are talking about the same religion that the Christian believes in. On this point we should agree with Lennon, that this contradictory and half-witted definition of religion really doesn’t make sense. Lennon, however, doesn’t come close to critiquing that religion which is not contradictory.

The non-contradictory conception of religious truth is just not given a moment’s standing in our modern society, or in the media, or in governing decisions and policies. Belief in God is allowed, and even protected by law and by the constitution, but only if it is the God that the deniers deny and not the God that believers believe. You may believe in your god, just don’t say he is the One True God, because in today’s society that is intolerant and unacceptable. That really means that you may freely believe in any god, just don’t really believe in him.

But belief in God intrinsically involves the exclusion of any other god as God. So the above view of religious freedom is contradictory, and Lennon was right to try to imagine it away.

For now let’s just leave out whether this is a proof of God’s existence. We’ll get back to what Anselm said, but for now let’s just say that whenever someone says, “There is no God” he just has a different definition and therefore a different conception of God than the God that the believer says he believes in. Or, to say it differently, when someone says, “There is no God” he changes the definition of God, and therefore his conception of God, from the one that the believer has in mind. The denier of God’s existence cannot have the same conception of God in his denial of God that the believer has in his belief in God. He who says there is no God is really just denying the God of his own conception, not the God that the believer conceives of.

Do we want it simpler than that? Ok, let’s try this: whenever someone comes up to you about your belief in God to try to convince you that there is no God, then you can quite honestly respond to him with, “I am in full agreement with you.” You may then add: “The god that you say does not exist I too say does not exist. However, if you want to talk about the God that I believe in instead, then I must insist that we talk about the same entity. Can you do that and be honest to it? Because there is one thing that you cannot honestly say about this God, and that is that He does not exist. Can we talk about Him, then?”