What is Meant by No Greater? Part I

It may seem to some that the definition “He than which a greater cannot be conceived” is confusing. Why not just say “the greatest being”? Why does a positive statement have to be put in negative form? It seems that this is a clumsy way to refer to something that is perfect in every way. There are things that need to be explained about the definition which Anselm uses.

In our cultural setting there is a push to have religion pushed out of any publicly supported area, such as schools, courts, government buildings or offices, and anything that is done in them. Since North American countries are built upon a Christian culture, it follows that removing religious symbols and attachments means removing Christianity. In Canada that means the removal of the Roman Catholic or Protestant religions. The ideas of the ‘Separation of Church and State’ and ‘Freedom of Religion’ have come to a point where the exact opposites of their original meanings are now the norm: separation of church from the state, and freedom from religion, respectively.

Just as in these instances we have allowed the secular community around us, the culture in which we live, to dictate to us what we are talking about, what religion means, what freedom of conscience means, so also we have also allowed the culture to tell us what the definition of God is. That is the unbeliever’s first objection to Anselm: it is the believer’s definition, the believer’s outline of who God is; and that means that the idea of existence is already in the definition. It isn’t really a logical sequence of propositions, but only a delusion of an outcome that was already there in the premise, in the supposition it started with. 

It should be noted that Anselm neither invented the definition nor corrupted it to suit his own beliefs. There are reasons for the definition being put this way, and one of them has partly to do with a concession that is made to the one who says there is no God. We have to have a definition of God that he will agree to and that at the same time does not compromise in any way the idea of the God that the Bible tells us about. If our agreed definition does not agree with what the Bible says about God then the entire discussion is for nothing for both sides of the debate. The God which the person wants to deny is exactly that God of the Bible.

At the same time it has to be a definition that asks the question of God’s existence, and yet does not beg the question of God’s existence. This was the first objection to Anselm’s argument, and remains so to this day. “Begging the question” is the term used to indicate that the consequence is already implied in, or defined into, the premise. The modern form of this objection is to assert that this argument is a fallacy because it is impossible to assert God’s existence without defining existence into the premise.

We will examine this in more detail in another post. But it should be noted here that the problem is not in the definition itself. They are right to a point, that the definition all by itself is not open to being answered the one way or the other, but not for the reason that is given. But giving at least this much to the one who says there is no God is, in the first place, not giving away our own position and still allows the denier his opportunity to argue his case.

Anselm’s argument points out that it is the denier that has the problem, not the believer. In order to deny God’s existence the unbeliever has to have a concept of what it is he is denying in his mind. His intended outcome is to deny that God exists. Therefore the existence of this very God, the one described by this very definition, is the one that at least has to have existence in his mind. Not another definition, but this one. He can’t very well accept another to this point. That his understanding is a contradiction is not the believer’s fault, nor is it the definition’s fault. The definition is a necessity because of who God is, not a construction to suit the believer’s belief.  

I realize that this is exactly the part that is in dispute in the modern debate on this argument for God’s existence. But no matter what definition is applied to God, it must conform to that God whose existence is either affirmed or denied, and must not be a definition so that the two sides can be talking about different beings. The one who denies God’s existence will insist on the possibility of God’s non-existence, and that is the conceptual conundrum that Anselm points to: how would one conceive of such a being and still deny the God revealed in the Bible? 

How do we formulate a definition that makes sure that both sides of the argument are talking about exactly the same subject? How do we define God so that we can know on both sides of the debate that the other side is not cheating and actually talking about another entity or conception?  There has to be a working definition to which both sides may appeal, and to which either side can hold the other accountable; and it must have honesty and integrity to the intellect. That being must by definition be none other than a being who alone can claim to be God. Both sides of the debate would have to conform their conception of such a being to that reality, whether or not He exists.

 Thus the definition is put into the negative form, in the sense that every imperfection of being is excluded. It should be remembered that the one who says there is no God must be referring to the God that the believer says he believes in, and not a god that the believer will also deny exists. The one who denies God’s existence really does nothing if he defines God in such a way that it is not the God of the Bible, but rather the one that conforms to his own conception of God. So the definition must be in such a way as to exclude concepts which do not attain to God’s essence. Anselm is following Augustine’s example, by putting into use Augustine’s famous line “Removing what is false leads us on by degrees to things divine.”

That’s the whole point: the conception has to reach upward towards the possibility of such a being, to bring this definition to within the grasp of the limited conceptions of man, and yet be true to His eternal essence. Our minds could never circumscribe such a being, but we could eliminate by definition all erroneous concepts and all imperfect deities, so that all that remained by definition was that one being which alone could be the object of our discussion. If we listed everything that God is then the list would be endless, but if we ruled out the things He could be not we could do that with a statement that is not disrespectful of such a holy being.

The objection states that this description of God, “He than which a greater cannot be conceived”, is not a definition which solves the question of God’s existence because it defines existence into God from the start. The problem with this is not that the believer cannot define the God that denier is denying without assuming existence, but rather that the denier cannot define the God that the believer believes without contradiction. The believer doesn’t have to prove that the god the denier denies is the God he believes; rather the denier has to prove that the God he denies is the God the believer believes.

The God the believer puts all his hope in is that being who alone is most necessary for all things, even though this necessity goes far beyond the comprehension and the concepts of men. That is the premise Anselm goes from, and the definition “He than which a greater cannot be conceived” is a necessary consequence from that. The God that it is necessary for the denier to assert in order to deny His existence must be this God and no other.

In his mind he has to accept the definition that God is he than which no greater can be conceived if He exists, which the believer believes, and which he denies.

But there are more reasons for this definition, especially for the believer.